Why are religious terrorists so lethal? Hezbollah
The lethality of religious radicals
What motivates terrorists? The afterlife and other myths
Terrorist organizations, why so few?
Internal economies and organizational efficiency
trade routes and defection
Terrorism and defection: Hamas
The Jewish underground: terrorists who overreached
Hezbollah and suicide attacks
Sects, prohibitions, and mutual aid: the organizational secrets of religious radicals
Prohibitions and sacrifices: the benign puzzles
Radical Islam and fertility
Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: Subsidized sacrifice
Subsidized prohibitions and fertility
How many radical Islamists?
The Hamas model: why religious radicals are such effective terrorists: The "Hamas model"
Social Service provision by the Taliban, Hezbollah, and al-Sadr
Why religious radicals are such lethal terrorists
Clubs and violence without religion
Rebels, insurgents, and terrorists
Coreligionists are soft targets
The future of suicide attacks
Constructive counterterrorism: How terrorist clubs succeed
Constructive counterterrorism
What's wrong with the old-fashioned methods?
Religious radicals and violence in the modern world: Radical Christians, benign and violent
The supernatural and credibility
Markets and denominations
Jewish and Muslim denominations
What's wrong with religion in government? Competition and pluralism
Analytical Appendix: The defection constraint
Clubs, loyalty, and outside options
Suicide attacks vs. hard targets
Protecting hard targets by improving outside options.
